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Deprivations of Liberty:
The Impact of the Charter on
Substantive Criminal Law
Alan Young
I. INTRODUCTION
The Government of Canada’s gift for the 30th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 has been the 2012 enactment of
the omnibus bill known as the Safe Streets and Communities Act.2 This
piece of legislation has been the culmination of five years of netwidening initiatives to increase sentence severity and to proscribe new
forms of criminal conduct. One might have expected that net-widening
of social control through criminal sanctions would have diminished and
not expanded in the Charter era, considering that rights-bearing constitutions are predicated on the values of classical liberalism. In this vision of
political life, the state’s role is largely to provide for order and security
by establishing the conditions to allow individuals to freely choose and
pursue the type of life they believe to be valuable and worthwhile
without compelling them to follow a particular conception of the good
life. The anomalous emergence of net-widening legislative initiatives in a
political regime of constitutional constraints raises the often-debated
question of whether there are constitutional limits to the growth of
substantive criminal law and, specifically, whether the right to liberty
enshrined in section 7 of the Charter can exert a countervailing force on a
political agenda premised upon increased criminalization as a response to
perceived social problems.
As we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Charter, it is interesting
and sobering to note that the World Justice Project’s 2011 report, The
Rule of Law Index, ranks Canada relatively low in terms of the protection
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of “fundamental rights” in comparison to other Western liberal democracies (Canada ranks ninth out of 12 countries).3 The World Justice Project
takes the position that compliance with the dictates of the rule of law
extend beyond the need for laws which are general, clear and accessible,
as it recognizes that the “rule of law must be more than merely a system
of rules — that indeed, a system of positive law that fails to respect core
human rights guaranteed and established under international law is at
best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be called a rule of law
system”.4 It is said that there are two versions of the rule of law, a thick
version and a thin version. A “thick” conception of the rule of law
demands that, in addition to meeting formal requirements, the law must
reflect substantive requirements (i.e., respect for dignity and equality and
the strengthening of fundamental freedoms), whereas a “thin” conception
places no substantive restrictions on law but does require that legal rules
contain minimum standards relating to clarity, accessibility and consistency.5 Although the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly held that the
rule of law is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the
Charter,6 the Court has also limited the scope of the principle and
suggested that “it is difficult to conceive of how the rule of law could be
used as a basis for invalidating legislation ... based on its content. That is
because none of the principles that the rule of law embraces speak
directly to the terms of legislation”.7
The Supreme Court of Canada may be correct in suggesting that the
rule of law principle does not place specific substantive constraints on
the content of criminal law, but the Court has failed to recognize how the
principle does serve to facilitate the protection of “fundamental rights” as
suggested by the World Justice Project. The rule of law and liberty are
intertwined. One need go no further than A.C. Dicey’s first of three
definitions of the rule of law: “no man is punishable or can be lawfully
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law
established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the
3
Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero & Alejandro Ponce, The World Justice Project
Rule of Law Index 2011 (Washington, DC: The World Justice Project, 2011), at 21-24, 51.
4
Id., at 11.
5
Mark Carter, “The Rule of Law, Legal Rights in the Charter, and the Supreme Court’s
New Positivism” (2008) 33 Queen’s L.J. 459.
6
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical
Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at para. 28 (S.C.C.).
7
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
473, at para. 59 (S.C.C.).
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land”.8 In this sense, the rule of law serves to limit arbitrary power by
ensuring that state-citizen relationships are governed by predictable rules
of general application, but it goes one step further in terms of having a
role to play in protecting liberty.
In serving to curb arbitrary power, Dicey’s simple pronouncement
establishes two constraints on the exercise of political power. One could
engage in an endless philosophical debate on the meaning and scope of
liberty in the futile effort to construct an “all-purpose, top-down, totalizing theory of liberty”,9 but it is easier, and more practical, to define
liberty in terms of Dicey’s first definition of the rule of law. First, liberty
cannot be overridden unless the state explicitly creates a prohibitory
sanction for the exercise of liberty. Liberty thrives where law does not
extend. In other words, a “totalizing” theory of liberty is not needed as
liberty becomes simply defined as any action not prohibited by law.
However, this simple constraint on political power cannot adequately
protect liberty in the face of a zealous crusader acting in the guise of a
lawmaker. Omnibus legislation prescribing countless restrictions on
liberty would not violate this notion of the rule of law, and liberty will be
precariously protected if one does not recognize that the rule of law’s
opposition to arbitrary rule entails another constraint beyond the formal
need to enact law in order to override liberty.
Accordingly, the rule of law imposes a second constraint on the exercise of arbitrary political power — the state should be able to provide a
reasoned justification if its authority to enact law is called into question.
Presumably, state action should be considered arbitrary if the state cannot
provide a reasoned justification for the action being undertaken. One
might disagree with the reasoning and the justification advanced by the
state, but this would not relegate the action to the realm of the arbitrary.
In commenting on the evolution of the concept of due process in the
Anglo-American tradition, it has been noted that “the due process of law
guarantee is an effort — one with deep roots in the history of western
civilization — to reduce the power of the state to a comprehensible,
rational and principled order, and to ensure that citizens are not deprived
of life, liberty, or property except for good reason”.10 Good reasons,
properly defined, can pre-empt any claim of arbitrariness.
8

A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1886), at 174.
McDonald v. Chicago (City), 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100 (2010) [hereinafter “McDonald”].
Timothy Sandefur, “In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of a Lawful
Rule” (2011) 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 284, at 285 (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Sandefur”].
9
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There may be differences in various jurisdictions with respect to the
specific rights enumerated in their constitutions, but several commentators have noted that a common feature of constitutional adjudication
around the world is the application of some form of proportionality test
in assessing the validity of state action.11 At the heart of any proportionality test is the idea that the state should be in a position to justify its
decision to override rights, and this justification will primarily involve
showing that it is pursuing valid objectives that “sound in the constitutional register”.12 As Professor Greene has noted:
Proportionality analysis is interesting not because it contemplates
balancing in the strict sense, which I presume to be a feature of all the
world’s constitutional courts, but because it does so only after requiring
the government to justify its actions by reference to a limited set of
objectives and procedural options. These distinctive features aim for
rule of law in the strictest sense — that is, the sense in which we mean
to reduce the discretion of the entire government, and not just of
judges.13

Canada may rank low in the Rule of Law Index, and in its protection
of fundamental rights, but it is not clear if this low ranking is being
assessed solely on the basis of the actions (or inaction) of government, or
whether this assessment includes the response of courts to state action.
Regardless, the inadequate protection of rights cannot be placed solely
on the shoulders of government in a constitutional regime, as “most
powerful supreme and constitutional courts in the world today understand their central mission to be the robust protection of fundamental
rights”.14 On the surface, it appears that Canadian courts, and constitutional courts around the world, also understand that the rule of law
prohibition on arbitrary power “means that legislatures are granted a
limited power to override constitutional rights, which is validly exercised
when the relevant burden of justification is satisfied”.15
In this brief paper, I will address two related questions with respect
to the contribution that section 7 of the Charter has made in advancing
11
Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two decades of Proportionality
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501.
12
Jamal Greene, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards” (2011) 99 Geo. L.J. 1288, at
1293.
13
Id.
14
Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, “All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review
and the Problem of Balancing” (2011) 60 Emory L.J. 797, at 870.
15
Stephen Gardbaum, “The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism”
(2008) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 391, at 430.
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the pursuit of liberty. The first question is whether the “right to liberty”
in section 7 protects “fundamental personal choices” by effectively
creating a private sphere of conduct and choice free from routine
criminalization. In other words, does section 7 facilitate “selfsovereignty”16 by ensuring that fundamental personal decisions will not
be the subject matter of criminal sanction unless the government has
compelling reasons to invade this sphere of self-sovereignty? Assuming
that a fundamental personal decision can be overridden by a compelling
state objective raises a second question: what constitutes a valid and
legitimate state objective that sounds in the constitutional register? In
other words, in the context of criminal law, what state objectives can
provide a sufficient justification to warrant the imposition of the punitive
sanction?
Professor Hamish Stewart concludes that “even though relatively few
statutes have been invalidated on section 7 grounds, the generous
interpretation of section 7 in the Motor Vehicle Reference has had a
beneficial effect on Canadian legal culture”.17 I would agree that the
rhetoric employed by Canadian courts in fundamental justice cases does
warmly embrace the notion of fundamental rights free from unjustified
state interference, and in that sense, there has been a “beneficial effect on
Canadian legal culture”. However, the assessment of the strength and
value of fundamental justice review by the Canadian judiciary is less
impressive when one looks specifically at the question of whether the
courts have employed a coherent and consistent approach to the question
of when the state may have compelling reasons to override a fundamental personal decision.

II. THE PROMISE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The concept of substantive due process means different things to different people, but at its essence it is a form of judicial review which
engages an assessment of the merits or value of public policy choices
as reflected in legislative enactments. The concept was developed by the
United States Supreme Court over the latter half of the 20th century, and
it has many detractors in the United States who condemn the doctrine as
a “contradiction in terms”, an “oxymoron”, a “momentous sham”, a
16

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, at 724 (1997) [hereinafter “Glucksberg”].
Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 311.
17
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“made-up, atextual invention” and the “most unconstitutional branch of
constitutional law”.18 The detractors believe that the concept of due
process only extends to review of state action for compliance with norms
of procedural fairness.
In previous papers, I have provided various justifications for engaging in vigorous substantive review in Canada,19 and it is not my intention
to revisit this ongoing debate. Suffice it to say, regardless of whether one
supports judicial activism or judicial deference, there is no question that
substantive review of some form has been accepted and adopted by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In 1985, in the seminal Motor Vehicle
Reference, Lamer J. noted that fundamental justice was not restricted to
procedural concerns and natural justice, and that “[t]he task of the Court
is not to choose between substantive or procedural content per se but to
secure for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ ... while
avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy”.20 A few years later,
Lamer J. dropped the admonishment of avoiding review of merits and
simply stated that “while Parliament retains the power to define the
elements of a crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more
important, the duty, when called upon to do so, to review that definition
to ensure that it is in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice”.21
In 2006, a badly divided Supreme Court assessed and reviewed the
merits of public health care and concluded that serious deficiencies in the
public system required the constitutional invalidation of a prohibition on
obtaining insurance for private health care.22 The Court recognized that
its review was an intrusion into a purely political consideration, i.e., the
merits of an exclusive and universal health care system and the efficient
allocation of resources to administer this system, but this did not stop the
Court. Chief Justice McLachlin noted that “it is the high duty of this
Court to insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their
18
Ryan C. Williams, “The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause” (2010) 120 Yale
L.J. 408, at 411; Sandefur, supra, note 10, at 284.
19
Alan N. Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content
of Criminal Law” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 441 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Done Nothing Wrong’”]; Alan
N. Young, “Fundamental Justice and Political Power: A Personal Reflection on Twenty Years in the
Trenches” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 121.
20
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”].
21
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at para. 26 (S.C.C.).
22
Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
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constitutional mandate”23 and “[t]he fact that the matter is complex,
contentious or laden with social values does not mean that the courts can
abdicate the responsibility”24 of review. Substantive review is not beyond
the authority of the Court, and “[t]he mere fact that this question may
have policy ramifications does not permit us to avoid answering it.”25
The real controversy in the United States surrounding substantive
due process review is not simply the idea of a court reviewing the merits
of public policy — this will be unavoidable with respect to some types of
constitutional claims. Rather, the controversy involves a fear that the
doctrine will allow a court to expand the protection of the Constitution
beyond specific rights enumerated in the document. In fact, this is
precisely what occurred in the zenith of American substantive review as
the Supreme Court created a constitutionally protected zone of privacy
despite the fact that privacy is not an enumerated right. The Court
extended the concept of substantive due process to include protection for
fundamental, but non-enumerated, rights on the theory that the rights
enumerated “in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”.26
In 1997 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a right to assisted suicide can be considered a fundamental, non-enumerated right. In rejecting assisted suicide as a fundamental
right the Court provided this summary of its achievements under the
rubric of substantive due process:
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 10681069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Due Process Clause “protects
individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them’”) (quoting Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662
(1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 14461447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Casey, 505 U.S., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at
2806-2807. In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the
specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty” specially
23
24
25
26

Id., at para. 107.
Id.
Id., at para. 108.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 484 (1965).
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protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967);
to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43
S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); to
use contraception, ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct.
1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), and to abortion,
Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the
Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 278-279, 110 S.Ct.,
at 2851-2852.27

In 2010 Stevens J. of the United States Supreme Court noted that the
“conceptual core” of the Due Process Clause “safeguards, most basically,
‘the ability to define one’s identity’, ‘the individual’s right to make
certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his
family’s, destiny’”.28 This list of American substantive due process
achievements in protecting autonomous decision-making on fundamental
personal matters was cited by Wilson J. in her concurring judgment in
the Morgentaler case.29 Although Morgentaler, and the constitutional
validity of a prohibition on abortion, was decided upon the basis of
procedural unfairness in accessing this medical service, Wilson J. was the
first Canadian judge to adopt the American due process concept that
equates the right to liberty with the right to make fundamental personal
decisions. She concluded that:
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter
is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the
right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed,
grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of
fundamental personal importance.30

27
28
29

Glucksberg, supra, note 16, at 719.
McDonald, supra, note 9, at 3101.
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mor-

gentaler”].
30

Id., at para. 228.
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After Morgentaler, the idea that the right to liberty extended to
fundamental personal decisions was cited with approval in numerous
decisions.31 In addition, the protection of fundamental personal decisions
finds further indirect support in cases dealing with the right to security.
There exists a significant overlap between the right to liberty and the
right to security when liberty is extended to fundamental personal
decisions. The right to security includes the right to protect one’s
physical and psychological integrity,32 and there is a greater likelihood of
psychological harm when state action interferes with decisions that are
integral to one’s personhood and identity. The Morgentaler invalidation
of the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code33 was predicated on the
fact that the procedural obstacles and delays found within the legislative
regime impaired a woman’s right to security by triggering an increased
risk of both physical and psychological harm. However, the increased
risk of psychological harm was directly related to the fact that the
legislation interfered with autonomous decision-making of a very
personal nature. Therefore, the right of security may not encompass a
right to autonomous decision-making, but in cases in which a court finds
that the security interest has been impaired because state action has
negatively affected one’s psychological well-being, this indirectly will
provide some protection for self-sovereignty and the right to make
fundamental personal decisions.34
In adopting the conceptual core of American due process by extending Charter protection to fundamental personal decisions, the Canadian
courts may not have fully realized that there has been a constitutional
price to be paid in American constitutional law when an individual’s
choice has been judicially characterized as being fundamental and
personal. When a right is characterized as fundamental the American
31
For example, Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94,
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (R.)”];
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1977] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Godbout”]; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”]; Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human
Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.); R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J.
No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Parker”]; Hitzig v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No.
3873, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 104 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hitzig”].
32
Morgentaler, supra, note 29; B. (R.), id.
33
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
34
Chaoulli, supra, note 22; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”]; Victoria (City) v.
Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”].
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courts are required to apply heightened or strict scrutiny upon judicial
review: the prohibition “may be justified by a compelling state interest
and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake”.35 However, if a fundamental right is not at issue, the courts
apply a more deferential standard known as “rational basis review” —
this lower standard of scrutiny only requires that the impugned legislation be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest”.36 The
constitutional cost of designating a right as fundamental is that it attracts
a form of strict judicial scrutiny which readily leads to invalidation,
whereas when legislation impairs a non-fundamental right, the lowered
standard of scrutiny rarely leads to invalidation.37
It did appear that the Supreme Court of Canada finally came to adopt
the American substantive due process concept that interference with
fundamental rights attracts strict scrutiny upon constitutional review. The
primacy of fundamental personal decisions crystallized in the overlooked
decision of the Court in Godbout in 1997.38 The Court confronted a
fundamental justice claim in a non-criminal context. As a condition of
employment for a municipality, the employee was required to reside
within its boundaries. The Court invalidated the regulation on the basis
that it unjustifiably interfered with the “irreducible sphere of personal
autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free
from state interference”.39 The Court noted that it had already identified
that “liberty” under section 7 extends beyond physical restrictions on
freedom to encompass matters which are “inherently personal such that,
by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core of
what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.40 The
Court concluded that “if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and
security of the person are to survive Charter scrutiny, they must be
‘fundamentally just’ not only in terms of the process by which they are
carried out but also in terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as measured against basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal
system more generally”.41 Freedom to choose one’s place of residence
35

Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, at 688 (1977).
Cook v. Gates, 528 F. 3d 42, at 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2008).
37
Julie McKenna, “Stay Calm, Don’t Get Hysterical: A User’s Guide to Arguing the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Vibrator Statutes” (2011) 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 211, at 242 [hereinafter
“McKenna”].
38
Godbout, supra, note 31.
39
Id., at para. 66.
40
Id.
41
Id., at para. 74.
36
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could be “subordinated to substantial and compelling collective interests”
but, in this case, the Court rejected a number of different state-sponsored
justifications for the residency restriction. Godbout laid the foundation of
exacting constitutional scrutiny when the law interferes with the right to
decisions of “fundamental personal importance”.
Strict scrutiny of fundamental rights’ violations is nothing more than
a rigorous balancing test with the scales tipped heavily in favour of the
rights-holder, whereas rational basis review for non-fundamental rights is
a balancing test with the scales tilted in favour of the state. This twotiered structure of judicial review has been implicitly incorporated into
fundamental justice review in Canada because the Supreme Court of
Canada has often undertaken fundamental justice review on the basis of
balancing state versus individual interests without the need for identifying a specific principle of fundamental justice. In most cases where a
balancing exercise is undertaken it would be reasonable to assume that as
the significance and importance of the right increases it will be incumbent on the state to provide a more significant and compelling reason for
violating the right. Strict scrutiny in cases of fundamental rights’ violation is a matter of common sense.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a balancing approach to section 7,42 and within two years the Court held that
“[f]undamental justice in our Canadian legal tradition ... is primarily
designed to ensure that a fair balance be struck between the interests of
society and those of its citizens”.43 A decade later, the Court held that
the relevant principles of fundamental justice are determined by a
contextual approach that “takes into account the nature of the decision
to be made”. ... The approach is essentially one of balancing. As we
said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the ... balancing process that the
outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of
contextual factors put into the balance”.44

As will be discussed, the Supreme Court of Canada has retreated
from the practice of balancing interests under section 7, but as the
Charter was evolving, the Court developed all the conceptual tools to
allow for vigorous judicial review to protect fundamental nonenumerated rights. Of course, the actual ability to achieve strict scrutiny
42

Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at para. 262 (S.C.C.).
44
Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 45, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
43
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of state objectives to override an interference with a fundamental
personal decision would be limited by two practical obstacles: a litigant’s
ability to compile the requisite legislative fact evidence, and the related
problem that the burden of proof lies with the litigant to demonstrate the
absence of a compelling state interest. Putting aside the notion that the
rule of law would be better served if the state bore the burden of providing a reasoned justification for any restriction on liberty, even with the
logistical obstacles, the courts have provided adequate doctrinal tools in
its interpretation of the Charter to allow this branch of government to
establish a zone of self-sovereignty free from criminal prohibition in the
absence of a compelling and narrowly-tailored state objective. This did
not actually happen.

III. THE REALITY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that the substantive merits of
legislation can be reviewed in the course of constitutional adjudication,
the courts do not readily embrace the concept that there is a sphere of
personal decision-making that is beyond the authority of the legislature
to control, save and except when there is a compelling state interest to
override self-sovereignty. The courts pay lip service to the concept, but
they rarely designate a person’s choice as being fundamental and
personal, and they rarely question whether the legislature has an interest
that rises to the level of a compelling state objective.
The Supreme Court has employed the rhetoric of liberty as a fundamental personal decision in a number of cases both before and after the
Godbout ruling. The discourse on fundamental personal decision has
arisen in the context of choice of residence,45 choice of shelter,46 choice
of medical treatment,47 choices relating to the care and upbringing of
one’s children,48 and choices relating to the terminal stages of one’s
life.49 However, the characterization of a decision as fundamental has
only led to the Court granting a remedy in three contexts: choice of
medical treatment; choice of residence; and choice of shelter. Godbout
was the frontrunner, and it did result in the invalidation of municipal
restriction on choice of residence because the restriction on the funda45
46
47
48
49

Godbout, supra, note 31.
Adams, supra, note 34.
Parker, supra, note 31; Hitzig, supra, note 31.
B. (R.), supra, note 31; G. (J.), supra, note 31.
Rodriguez, supra, note 31.
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mental decision of where to reside was not overridden by a compelling
state interest. However, even this designation of choice of residence as a
fundamental, personal decision has proved controversial as, in 2011, the
Supreme Court of Canada called into question this designation as not
representing the views of the majority of the Court.50
With the designation of choice of personal residence as a fundamental decision being called into question, the only incontrovertible example
of a liberty interest being designated as fundamental, and leading to farreaching remedies, involves the decision-making with respect to the
choice of medical treatment. The choice of medical treatment being
designated as a fundamental personal decision has led to a suspended
invalidation of laws relating to use of marijuana until the Parliament
of Canada created a meaningful exemption program to allow medical
patients to legally access and use marijuana as medicine.51 It has also led
to the lifting of the prohibition on privately insured medical treatment.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the choice of
medical treatment should be treated as a fundamental right to autonomous decision-making.52 As mentioned earlier, the elevation of medical
decision-making to the level of a fundamental right is further strengthened by the fact that the courts have found in some cases that interference with this right constitutes a violation of one’s right to security under
section 7 without needing to rely upon the concept of liberty as encompassing fundamental, personal decisions.53
Outside of the context of medical care, the concept of fundamental,
personal decision-making has had little or no practical impact. For
example, in Rodriguez,54 the Supreme Court had little difficulty in
characterizing the choice of when to terminate one’s life as a fundamental, personal decision, but this characterization did not lead the Court to
assess whether Parliament had a compelling interest in prohibiting
assisted suicide. Instead of assessing whether a compelling interest can
serve to override the fundamental right, the Court simply concluded that
Canada and other jurisdictions have historically limited the right to
terminate one’s life, and this historical practice seemed to serve as a
50
Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J.
No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670, at paras. 93-94 (S.C.C.).
51
Parker, supra, note 31; Hitzig, supra, note 31; Canada (Attorney General) v. Sfetkopoulos, [2008] F.C.J. No. 448, 2008 FCA 106 (F.C.A.).
52
C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No 30, 2009
SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A.C. v. Manitoba”].
53
Chaoulli, supra, note 22; Insite, supra, note 34.
54
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proxy for Parliament having a compelling interest in the modern era.
Similarly, In B. (R.),55 the Court was faced with the right of parents to
choose a medical intervention for their child which was consistent with
their religious beliefs, but it ultimately held that the state had legitimate
interests in overriding the fundamental, personal decision without an
exacting assessment of whether these interests were compelling and
narrowly tailored.
One can see how the designation as fundamental becomes mere rhetorical device by looking at how lower courts have recently applied the
concept.56 In 2011, a challenge was brought to provincial law which
prevented the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk. In an era of
mass production of food, with the recurring problem of food recalls due
to contamination, one can easily see how the choice of what foods one
consumes might be characterized as a fundamental, personal decision.
The Court acknowledges that this is an appropriate characterization, but
the characterization does not lead to a form of strict scrutiny in search of
a narrowly tailored state objective. The Court simply applies a deferential
standard akin to the rational basis review employed by American courts.
The Court stated:
It is acknowledged that in general terms an individual has the right to
make decisions regarding their own bodily integrity and personal
health, as recognized by La Forest J. in Rodriguez v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at paragraph 36. However, it
does not logically follow that the right to security of the person of raw
milk consumers will necessarily be infringed if the Respondent’s cowshare arrangement is found to be illegal. The preponderance of
scientific evidence cited offers factual support for the assertion that
human consumption of raw milk may be hazardous to one’s health or at
least more hazardous than the health risk presented by the consumption
of pasteurized milk. The wide interest in this litigation serves to
confirm this assessment is not universally held and there are many
residents of Ontario who have consumed a life-times worth of raw milk
and raw milk products without any ill effects. On the basis of the expert
evidence provided at trial it cannot however be concluded, in my view,

55

B. (R.), supra, note 31.
R. v. Schmidt, [2011] O.J. No. 4272 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter “Schmidt”]; Thurber v. Thurber, [2002] A.J. No. 992, 2002 ABQB 727 (Alta. Q.B.); De Guzman v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 2119, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 655 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 70 (S.C.C.); Marchand v. Ontario, [2006] O.J. No. 2387, 81 O.R. (3d)
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that the resultant legislative restriction on the sale and distribution of
raw milk is either arbitrary or overly broad.57

Perhaps the application of a rational basis test to a fundamental, personal decision can be justified on the basis that the prohibition on the
sale of unpasteurized milk was not a criminal sanction but a mere
regulatory offence. However, it would be difficult to justify resorting to
the low, deferential standard when the state interferes with the fundamental, personal decision by resorting to the moral condemnation of the
criminal sanction. Yet, in the recent challenge to the prohibition on
polygamous relationships,58 the Court had no difficulty concluding that
one’s choice of life partner(s) is a fundamental personal decision (as was
decided by American courts over 40 years ago), but this characterization
did not appear to have a practical impact on the constitutional analysis.
The Court did go to great lengths to identify the various state objectives
underlying the prohibition, but strict scrutiny for a narrowly tailored
interest was not undertaken. There is little doubt that the state has an
interest in protecting individuals from abusive relationships, but if the
concept of a fundamental right has any practical meaning, it is not
sufficient to simply identify that Parliament has a rational basis for
enacting the prohibition. The real question should have been whether
Parliament’s interest is so compelling that it is constitutionally authorized
to enact a blanket prohibition which prevents those who are not in
abusive polygamous relationships from exercising their fundamental
right to choose their life partners.
Due to the fact that it would be difficult for a court to justify the use
of a low, deferential standard of review when Parliament has interfered
with fundamental choices by way of criminal sanction, it is easier for a
court to recast a person’s choices as trivial as opposed to fundamental. In
the challenges to the prohibition on the use and possession of marijuana,
the Supreme Court did not feel the need to employ an exacting, strict
scrutiny review because it characterized the choice to use marijuana as a
trivial lifestyle choice. The Court stated:
While we accept Malmo-Levine’s statement that smoking marihuana is
central to his lifestyle, the Constitution cannot be stretched to afford
protection to whatever activity an individual chooses to define as
central to his or her lifestyle. One individual chooses to smoke
57

Schmidt, id., at para. 85.
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marihuana; another has an obsessive interest in golf; a third is addicted
to gambling. The appellant Caine invokes a taste for fatty foods. A
society that extended constitutional protection to any and all such
lifestyles would be ungovernable. Lifestyle choices of this order are
not, we think, ‘basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy
individual dignity and independence’ (Godbout, supra, at para. 66).
In our view, with respect, Malmo-Levine’s desire to build a lifestyle
around the recreational use of marihuana does not attract Charter
protection. There is no free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’
for recreational purposes.59

It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if strict scrutiny is
applied to personal decisions which are picayune and petty, but one has
to question whether a choice of lifestyle should be so quickly relegated to
the category of the trivial. It is not helpful to marginalize the claim as
being the assertion of a “free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’
for recreational purposes”. Narrowing the characterization of the claim
renders it absurd. There is an abundance of sociological and anthropological evidence which demonstrates that the alteration of consciousness
through plant intoxicants is an integral and fundamental aspect of
personhood. Further, in the tradition of classical liberalism, the state
should not be dictating lifestyle preferences, as the personal quest for
self-fulfilment will take the individual down many different paths. It
would be easy to characterize sporting activities as a mere lifestyle
choice, but one has to wonder whether the Court would apply the same
low, deferential standard of review should Parliament decide in its
wisdom to ban sporting activities upon pain of criminal sanction.
Despite its analytical potential and promise, it appears that creating
the category of “fundamental personal decision” has not really helped in
the analysis of section 7 liberty claims. First, dividing personal decisions
into fundamental and non-fundamental is a value-laden exercise, and
without the development of some criteria for determining when a
decision goes to the core of personhood, the section 7 analysis will be
unpredictable and confused. Perhaps there is a zone of self-sovereignty
that demands strict scrutiny upon judicial review, but it is not readily
ascertainable within the current doctrinal approach. Second, when the
Court can easily designate a decision as fundamental, this ultimately
does not assist the analysis because the Court does not provide any
59
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at paras.
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specific or unique methodology for analyzing the constitutionality of
state interference with this type of fundamental decision.
Not only is the fundamental rights doctrine unpredictable and underdeveloped, there is also reason to conclude that the Court is basically
unwilling to apply strict scrutiny, in its most rigorous form, to any
parliamentary decision to criminalize conduct. The marijuana challenge
has limited a court’s ability to impose strict scrutiny in reviewing the
validity of criminal legislation in two significant ways. First, the Court
would not employ a balancing test of proportionality to determine
whether the state objective could override the liberty interest of the
accused. The Court employed the “basic tenets” approach to address a
more specific question of whether there exists a principle of fundamental
justice that dictates that Parliament can only criminalize conduct upon
proof of significant harm to others or society at large. Under the basic
tenets approach, a principle becomes elevated into a constitutional
principle of fundamental justice, if three criteria can be met: (1) “[i]t
must be a legal principle”; (2) there must be a “consensus that the harm
principle is vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice”; and (3)
it must be “capable of being identified with some precision”.60 There is
no question that these criteria provide a more transparent framework of
analysis than does the proportionality analysis of state/citizen balancing,61 but this basic tenets approach is self-limiting because so few
substantive principles can or will be elevated to this status.62 In addition,
a basic tenet will prove resistant to growth and expansion because the
requirement of “some degree of precision” will preclude principles of
high generality from being adopted. Principles stated at a high level of
generality have the potential for growth as the principle becomes
instantiated in concrete cases.
In the marijuana cases, the Court concluded that the “harm principle”
was not a principle of fundamental justice because it was not a legal
principle and it could not be defined with precision.63 As a result,
Parliament is not constitutionally required to ensure that all criminal
offences being enacted are based upon conduct harmful to others or to
60
Malmo-Levine, id.; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.).
61
Stewart, supra, note 17, at 311.
62
In his book, id., Professor Stewart identifies five substantive principles: a law must not be
overly vague; a law must not be overbroad; a law must not be arbitrary; the impact of a law must not
be grossly disproportionate; and the state must obey the law.
63
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society at large. At its highest, the Court may require that Parliament
have a reasoned apprehension of a non-trivial harm, but in rejecting the
harm principle as a limiting principle, the Court also gave the stamp of
approval to criminalization in pursuit of paternalistic objectives. In
addition, the Court found that the state objectives of protecting the
vulnerable and the protection of core, societal values were objectives
which sound in the constitutional register. The only state objective which
the Court rejected as valid or legitimate for the purposes of criminal law
is the imposition of a “certain standard of public and sexual morality”64
or to “maintain conventional standards of propriety” which do not
involve “some fundamental conception of morality”.65 Whether intentionally or inadvertently, the basic tenets approach adopted by the Court
authorizes Parliament to override liberty by criminal sanction whenever
it has some rational basis for concluding a perceived social problem
needs to be addressed by invocation of the criminal law. The bottom line
is that there are no effective constitutional limits on the choice to
criminalize conduct, and there is currently no zone of self-sovereignty
which is presumptively beyond the reach of the criminal law unless the
state can present compelling and narrowly tailored objectives to justify
the intrusion in liberty.
Even though balancing has problems of indeterminacy and subjectivity that do not plague the basic tenets approach, balancing is the type of
proportionality analysis which is needed to establish effective substantive
review. It is this type of analysis which can give practical effect to the
concept that restrictions on fundamental rights need to be subject to
exacting constitutional scrutiny. However, it appears that, in 2004, the
Supreme Court finally laid to rest the overt public policy balancing
which had been employed in earlier Charter cases. In the Demers case,66
the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated provisions which effectively
prevented an accused who is permanently unfit to stand trial, from ever
being absolutely discharged. The Court concluded that the provisions
suffered from constitutional overbreadth, but it was also argued that, on
balance, the individual’s liberty and security interest outweighed Parliament’s goal on public protection. This balancing act was rejected by the
Court:
64
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In making this argument, the respondent misconceives the role played
by ... “balancing” in the structure of s. 7 of the Charter. It effectively
argues that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the correct
balance be struck between individual and societal interests. However,
as a majority of this Court made clear in the case of Malmo-Levine ...
the “balancing of interests” referred to by McLachlin J. in Cunningham
is to be taken into consideration by courts only when they are deriving
or construing the content and scope of the principles of fundamental
justice themselves. It is not in and of itself a freestanding principle of
fundamental justice which must be respected if a deprivation of life,
liberty and security of the person is to be upheld.67

It is not at all clear what type of balancing would be undertaken in
“deriving or construing the content and scope of the principles of
fundamental justice themselves”, nor is it clear if this decision has
definitively eliminated proportionality and balancing from the fundamental justice equation. Since Demers, the Supreme Court of Canada has on
two occasions employed a “striking the right balance” approach to the
adjudication of a fundamental justice claim,68 so it appears that the allure
of balancing proves to be irresistible. Even though balancing will be a
more effective technique to develop the zone of self-sovereignty, this
assertion is predicated on the assumption that the courts would then
naturally employ a form of strict scrutiny when confronted with a
fundamental rights claim under section 7. This is not a safe assumption
because it is not patently obvious that the Court has employed strict
scrutiny when confronted with a fundamental rights claim under section
2(b) of the Charter. Unlike the right to liberty, freedom of expression
comes with a built-in designation of being fundamental, and, even
though the rhetoric of the Court tracks the strict scrutiny approach, the
practical application of this approach falls short in terms of rigorous
strict scrutiny.
The doctrinal structure of section 2(b) challenges requires the court
to immediately apply a balancing or proportionality test because all
forms of expression are covered by section 2(b), and the ultimate
determination of the validity of the restriction turns on the application of
the section 1 reasonable limits test. Upon a review of 31 constitutional
challenges launched under section 2(b) of the Charter, we find 19 cases
in which the restriction on expression was upheld under section 1, and 13
67
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cases in which the restriction was invalidated. However, of the 13
invalidations, only two were predicated on the finding that the state did
not have a “pressing and substantial” interest (i.e., compelling interest),69
and the others were predicated upon the minimal impairment component
of the section 1 analysis (i.e., narrowly tailored). In fact, despite the
fundamental nature of an expressive rights claim, it appears that virtually
any state objective can override the fundamental right if the restriction is
narrowly tailored. Restrictions on speech have been validated in pursuit
of preventing street nuisance,70 protecting personal reputation,71 combating noise pollution,72 maintaining a neutral public service,73 preventing
littering and aesthetic blight74 and providing “a safe, welcoming public
transit system”.75 Many of the section 2(b) challenges involve noncriminal restrictions; however, the fact that expression is criminalized has
not led to a more exacting scrutiny of whether the state’s overriding
objective is truly compelling. There have been six challenges to criminalized speech, and in five of the cases the restriction was upheld as the
Court readily accepted that the state had a pressing and narrowly tailored
objective.76 The only case in which the Court did not find a pressing
objective was with respect to the archaic offence of “spreading false
news”. The Court concluded that the offence was originally designed to
protect the nobility from slanderous statements and there was no evidence of a contemporary social problem necessitating the criminalization
of spreading false news. This is the only case in which strict scrutiny was
applied to the requirement of a compelling state objective, and its
precedential value is limited as the invalidation is largely predicated on
the fact that the offence is a relic of an earlier political and social culture.
The rather timid approach to questioning state objectives becomes
clearer when contrasted to American jurisprudence on free speech. In
2011, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
69
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a California prohibition on the sale of “violent video games” to minors.77
The Court first confirmed that restrictions on the content of protected
speech are invalid unless the state “can demonstrate that it passes strict
scrutiny — that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”.78 It then concluded
that “California cannot meet that standard” because it “cannot show a
direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors”.79
There were competing empirical studies on this issue, but the Court
concluded that this is insufficient to override a fundamental right as the
studies only “show at best some correlation between exposure to violent
entertainment and miniscule real-world effects”.80 In Canada, this type of
inconclusive evidence is a sufficient basis for grounding a state interest
capable of overriding any right. There is a world of difference between
this exacting approach on the American court and the deferential approach the Supreme Court of Canada has taken in addressing the fact that
there are competing studies on whether obscene depictions cause, or are
correlated, to anti-social conduct. In Butler, the Supreme Court upheld
criminal restrictions on obscene expression, noting that:
Accordingly, the rational link between s. 163 and the objective of
Parliament relates to the actual causal relationship between obscenity
and the risk of harm to society at large. On this point, it is clear that the
literature of the social sciences remains subject to controversy. ...While
a direct link between obscenity and harm to society may be difficult, if
not impossible, to establish, it is reasonable to presume that exposure to
images bears a causal relationship to changes in attitudes and beliefs. ...
In the face of inconclusive social science evidence, the approach
adopted by our Court in Irwin Toy is instructive. In that case, the basis
for the legislation was that television advertising directed at young
children is per se manipulative. The Court made it clear, at p. 994, that
in choosing its mode of intervention, it is sufficient that Parliament had
a reasonable basis:
•

77
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a reasonable basis, on the evidence tendered, for concluding that the ban on all advertising directed at
children impaired freedom of expression as little as possible given the government’s pressing and substantial
objective.
And at p. 990:
•

... the Court also recognized that the government was
afforded a margin of appreciation to form legitimate
objectives based on somewhat inconclusive social science
evidence.81

The Court’s deferential assumption that legislatures have a “good
reason” to restrict fundamental rights is aptly captured by the Court’s
statement that “in our view Parliament is also entitled to act on reasoned
apprehension of harm even if on some points ‘the jury is still out’”.82
Limiting rights on the basis of inconclusive evidence might be justified
in the regulatory world, but once the choice of state intervention rises to
the level of criminal sanction it would be reasonable to assume that a
more exacting standard would be imposed. This expectation should be
heightened when the sanction is being applied to the exercise of fundamental rights.
Contrasting the American and Canadian approaches to strict scrutiny
in the area of expressive freedom does lead to the mistaken perception
that American jurists take the concept of a fundamental right more
seriously than their Canadian counterparts. This is probably true in the
area of expressive freedom; however, in terms of substantive due process
and liberty, the early potential for achieving zealous protection of
fundamental, personal decisions through the vehicle of substantive due
process review has equally floundered in both jurisdictions. Despite the
fact that American courts created the concept of non-enumerated fundamental rights, as time wore on American courts became reluctant to
designate any new fundamental rights and continue to apply strict
scrutiny to recognized decisions of a fundamental and personal nature.
The retreat of American courts, and the dilution of the doctrine of strict
scrutiny for fundamental liberty rights, has undercut the significance and
value of the American approach for defining liberty in the Canadian
context.
81
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One of the problems which plagues both Canadian and American
constitutional adjudication with respect to the validity of criminal
sanctions targeting fundamental personal decisions has been the noticeable absence of any coherent theory of criminal justice animating the
court decisions. The following critique from an American commentator
applies with equal force to the shorter history of Canadian courts
struggling with the contours and scope of liberty:
Indeed, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923 through the recent
case of Lawrence v. Texas in 2004, the Court has been deciding cases
about the limits of criminal law. The confusion, that most people do not
think the Court has ever adopted any constitutional theory on
substantive criminal law, stems from the Court’s own decisions. None
of the decisions explicitly reference traditional canons of criminal law;
none of them rely on academic or philosophical justifications for
criminalization; none of them acknowledge the limits of criminal
sanctions as an independent constitutional value. Rather, these
decisions rely on more rhetorical, lofty values such as privacy or
liberty.83

The first indication of the retreat of the American courts came in
1986 with the infamous decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia criminal prohibition on
sodomy.84 The previous cases on substantive due process appeared to
establish as a fundamental liberty or privacy interest the right to sexual
autonomy. The Court bluntly ruled that there is no fundamental right for
homosexuals to engage in sodomy primarily because “condemnation of
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards”.85 This decision allowed the dead weight of history to govern
the development of fundamental, personal decisions worthy of constitutional protection.
History once again exerted a regressive force on American doctrine
in 1997 when the United States Supreme Court articulated a new approach to determining when a right can be designated as fundamental for
purposes of triggering strict scrutiny. In addressing whether assisted
suicide can be designated as a fundamental, personal decision, the Court
starts by noting that “we begin, as we do in all our due process cases by

83
Eric Tennen, “Is the Constitution in Harm’s Way? Substantive Due Process and Criminal
Law” (2004) 8 Boalt. J. Crim. L. 3, at 4.
84
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) [hereinafter “Bowers”].
85
Id., at 197.

96

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

examining our nation’s history, legal traditions and practices”.86 The
Court then reiterates that we “have always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process”87 before creating a new two-part test
for classifying a right as fundamental or not:
Our established method of substantive due process analysis has two
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specifically protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition”. ... Second, we have required in substantive due process
cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.88

In applying the new criteria to the issue of assisted suicide, the Court was
able to easily conclude that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest”, and that the prohibition
is “rationally related to legitimate government objectives”.89 To ensure
that there is little doubt that the Court is signalling a retreat, the Court
concludes by noting that “we do not weigh the relative strengths of these
various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and
Washington’s ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their
promotion and protection.”90 Although the United States Supreme Court
makes no mention of our Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, both
courts arrive at the same deferential conclusions based primarily on the
dead weight of history.
In 2003, there was a brief moment when it appeared that the United
States Supreme Court was returning to its earlier activist approach to
liberty with the release of the decision in Lawrence v. Texas.91 The Court
overturned its 1986 Bowers decision and invalidated a Texas sodomy
prohibition. In a decision of “staggering rhetorical breadth”92 the Court
ruled that decisions about sexual intimacy were captured within the
liberty interests protected by the due process clause. The Court’s rhetorical breadth includes:
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Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling house or other private places. ... Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate
conduct. ... when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.93

On first impression, Lawrence appears to create a distinctive zone of
self-sovereignty in matter of sexual intimacy — the rhetoric supports the
designation of sexual autonomy as a fundamental right which can only
be overridden by a compelling and narrowly tailored state interest.
However, a deeper look reveals that the Court was careful to ensure that
it did not explicitly designate the right as fundamental, nor did it stipulate
the standard of review it was employing. The dead weight of history
from Glucksberg still played a major role, as the Court’s primary reason
for overturning its earlier Bowers decision was its different understanding of the nation’s traditions. Contrary to Bowers’ historical account, the
Court concluded that “there has been no longstanding history in this
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”.94
The Court is clear as to what type of conduct is excluded from selfsovereignty in sexual matters: conduct with minors; conduct involving
injury or coercion; public conduct or prostitution;95 however, there is a
lack of guidance and clarity with respect to sexual conduct warranting
constitutional protection. In the post-Lawrence era courts are reaching
disparate and inconsistent results on the reach of the right to sexual
autonomy in the context of challenges to “anti-vibrator” laws, restrictions
on “sexting”, polygamy and adult incest.96 It has been noted that “approximately seven years of Lawrence jurisprudence have demonstrated
that courts are unwilling to find that Lawrence establishes a fundamental
right”.97 Lawrence did manage to overturn the atavistic aversion that the
Court displayed in 1986 with respect to homosexual sexuality, but it
appears that the decision was not designed to do much more or to
advance the substantive due process right to sexual autonomy:
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Although Lawrence’s holding is clear — Texas’s statutory proscription
against homosexual sodomy is unconstitutional and Bowers is
overturned — it is unclear how the Court arrived at its holding.
Kennedy extensively criticized Bowers but did not engage in a lengthy
discussion of the statute at issue in Lawrence. Additionally, Kennedy
did not articulate whether the right to engage in private consensual sex
acts is a fundamental right or a simple liberty interest; and, under what
level of review the Court evaluated the Texas statute: rational basis,
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny. These unanswered questions
make Lawrence a complicated decision with several conceivable
interpretations.98

Lawrence does not change the fact that the Court in Glucksberg
changed the rules of the game to ensure that strict scrutiny for fundamental rights will rarely occur. The promise and potential of substantive due
process has stalled as the lower courts struggle to understand the new
rules of engagement:
Unfortunately, the system described in Glucksberg has run into
problems. This should be no surprise given the polarization that both
the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test have undergone. The
strict scrutiny test is so strict that almost all legislation fails to meet it.
Although it may not actually live up to its reputation as “strict in
theory, fatal in fact,” it is the rare case indeed where legislation lives up
to its requirements. Because of this, the Court has retreated into what
one commentator has referred to as a “rights-identifying shell,” where it
is hesitant to identify new rights. On the other hand, the only alternative
allowed by the formula is the rational basis test, which is tantamount to
no test at all ... .
What has emerged, then, is an unworkable system. In this system, the
Court professes to have a standard framework for substantive due
process, the Glucksberg test, with a carefully regimented procedure for
defining rights and then assessing their importance, which then
translates into a formula for judging the validity of the law in question.
The problem comes in cases where this framework produces a result
that is incompatible with what the majority of the Justices think the
right answer should be. In these “hard” cases, the right involved is not
sufficiently accepted as important enough to be classified as
fundamental. However, the only alternative is the rational basis test,
which, as noted above, is almost toothless. In such circumstances, the
98
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Court abandons the framework altogether. Thus, instead of the
framework determining the answer, the answer itself determines the
framework in many cases.99

As in Canada, one cannot categorically conclude, based on the first
three decades of the Charter, that the courts will never employ strict
scrutiny to assess the validity of criminal sanctions being applied to
fundamental, personal decisions. More accurately, it can be said that
under the current doctrinal framework, the decision as to whether to
designate a personal decision as fundamental and deserving of strong
protection remains inscrutable and unpredictable. In reviewing the
evolving history of substantive due process review in the United States,
Professor Conkle has concluded that the American approach has become
malleable and uncertain:
[T]he contemporary Supreme Court has shifted its terminology from
the “right of privacy” to “liberty,” and it has replaced strict scrutiny
with a more open-ended balancing test. In so doing, the Court has
formally and significantly moderated the doctrine of substantive due
process. At the same time, however, the Court’s increasingly flexible
approach is more malleable than its previous doctrine, making it all the
more obvious that the Court is picking and choosing the liberties that it
deems worthy of special protection. And the Court continues to be bold
and aggressive, albeit on a highly selectively basis. In Stenberg, for
example, the Court invalidated a “partial birth abortion” prohibition
despite the broad political sentiment that favors such a ban. And in
Lawrence, the Court reached out to overrule an existing precedent, and
a relatively recent one at that, thereby thrusting itself once again onto
the cultural battlefield of contemporary America.100

Although American and Canadian courts have not developed a coherent and predictable approach to liberty and autonomous decisionmaking, there has been greater success in Canada in employing section 7
of the Charter to give effect to the “thin” version of the rule of law. To
respect the dictates of the thin version of the rule of law, the Supreme
Court has created four doctrinal tools to evaluate the validity of criminal
legislation: (1) the law must not be vague;101 (2) the law must not be
99
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arbitrary (the law does “little or nothing to enhance the state’s interest”);102 (3) the law must not be overbroad (the means chosen to achieve
the state objective “are broader than is necessary to accomplish that
objective”);103 (4) the law must not be grossly disproportionate (the
effects/harms of the law on people are grossly disproportionate when
considered in light of the state objective).104
Although there is an overlap among the four doctrinal tools, they are
independent mechanisms for assessing whether the deprivation of liberty
by criminal sanction is in accord with the principles of fundamental
justice.105 These principles only permit indirect review of the merits of
the law, as they are predicated only on reviewing the means chosen to
achieve legislative ends. The ends or objective are not questioned as part
of the review process. The four doctrinal tools developed by Canadian
courts are far more rigorous than the tools employed by American courts
to assess legislation in terms of compliance with the thin version of the
rule of law.
The vagueness doctrine was originally developed in the United
States, and both jurisdictions employ the same elements and criteria for
the assessment of the clarity of law.106 However, there is no American
counterpart to the “gross disproportionality” doctrine, and the American
arbitrariness and overbreadth doctrines, exist in a very limited manner.
Facial review of legislation in the United States is very limited and a
facial attack can only be sustained if it can be proven that “no set of
circumstances exist under which [the legislation] would be valid” or
“that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep”.107 This test incorporates the spirit of our arbitrariness and overbreadth doctrines but the
102
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review for these constitutional vices in the United States is basically
toothless, as it sets the bar too high. With respect to facial review for
First Amendment challenges, the United States Supreme Court expands
the overbreadth doctrine in a way that makes it more in line with the
Canadian approach — a law restricting speech is overbroad “if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to
the state’s plainly legitimate sweep”,108 but this review of overbreadth
does not extend to liberty claims.
In the past year, the strength of the Canadian approach to compliance
with the thin version of the rule of law has been demonstrated in dramatic fashion. In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada relied upon these
tools to compel the government of Canada to maintain an exemption,
granted to a safe injection site, to allow this clinic to provide a safer
venue for heroin addicts to inject their drugs.109 In March 2012, the Court
of Appeal of Ontario invalidated, and read down, some of the prostitution-related provisions in the Criminal Code, primarily on the basis that
these provisions impaired the security interests of sex workers by
denying them the legal ability to take basic safety measures when
working.110 These are significant decisions that show that review of
criminal legislation on the basis of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality can impose significant constraints on legislative and
executive acts. The cases may not advance the concept of liberty as
fundamental, personal decision-making, but it is important to recognize
that although there is confusion and uncertainty surrounding judicial
implementation of fundamental rights under a thick version of the rule of
law, the courts have shown a greater willingness to become more critical
and demanding of lawmakers in terms of implementation of the “thin”
version of the rule of law.

IV. THE WEAK LINKS IN THE CHAIN
The judicial reluctance to embrace heightened scrutiny for nonenumerated, fundamental freedoms may be a simple product of the fact
that there is nothing in the structure of the Charter which inexorably
leads to this powerful form of judicial review. The American role model
may have appeared to be an attractive approach as the American courts’
108
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reliance upon the “penumbra” of non-enumerated rights turned out to be
a valuable tool for overturning some very regressive state policies in past
decades. However, in contemporary times, the role model has retreated
from this activist role. Although a commitment to classic liberalism and
the rule of law supports the notion that the state must provide a reasoned
justification for curtailing liberty, the concept puts a strain on judicial
competence and legitimacy. It is easier to presume that lawmakers have a
reasoned justification for acting than putting the government to strict
proof of the compelling objective being pursued. In addition, courts may
be reluctant to expand the reach of the Charter by creating a zone of selfsovereignty because the exercise is fraught with subjectivity and indeterminacy. Sticking to the four corners of the text of the Charter is a safe
option that does not expose the judiciary to accusations of political
overreaching.
Beyond the simple fact that judges may be uncomfortable taking on
the responsibility of creating zones of self-sovereignty, which would be
virtually immunized from state intrusion, there are other weak links in
the chain. Both the crude structure of constitutional review and adjudication, and the state’s routine reliance upon blanket prohibitions, have
stultified the growth of the thick version of the rule of law. Constitutional
review is driven by the ultimate goal of invalidating legislation, and this
zero-sum approach to constitutional remedies serves to deter most judges
from embracing strict scrutiny for non-enumerated rights. The lack of
nuance and flexibility in addressing constitutional claims does not foster
judicial creativity. Any drive to creative activism is further deterred by
the fact that legislatures tend to employ blanket prohibitions to address
undesirable conduct. The same lack of nuance and flexibility in the
legislative initiative effectively prevents a court from addressing constitutional flaws in legislation with a less drastic remedy than invalidation,
such as reading down the legislation to meet constitutional standards, or
reading in the missing elements needed to make the legislation constitutionally sound.
In theory, there is little conceptual difficulty in categorizing and designating the choices of life-partners, and the decision about terminating
one’s life, as fundamental, personal decisions. As mentioned earlier, it
could be argued that the choice of intoxicating substances could also be
designated as fundamental. However, the challenges to polygamy,
assisted suicide and marijuana possession all failed partly because the
Court was forced into the zero-sum game of wholesale invalidation of a
blanket prohibition. Substantive due process could not be achieved
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because the Court was concerned about the practical impact of the
legislative vacuum of invalidation. So, the Court avoids this untenable
situation by either trivializing the fundamental choice claim by calling it
a mere lifestyle choice, or by exaggerating the compelling nature of the
state interest.
The Court can only stickhandle around the practical implications of
designating a right as fundamental by elevating the state objective so that
it appears compelling. This is accomplished by creating an impression
that the conduct being restricted by state action is inherently harmful, and
in this way, it becomes hard to resist the state’s claim that the blanket
restriction on liberty is necessary for the proper functioning of society. In
the construction of the state objective, all polygamists are exploitive, all
drug users are irresponsible, all sex workers are vulnerable to predatory
pimps and all terminal patients are incapable of autonomous choice.
Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue
properly, I think it can be said with little doubt that there are egalitarian
polygamists, responsible drug-users, respectful purveyors of sex and
autonomous suicide-planners. We often do not know the percentage of
those who are good citizens and those who are in danger or are dangerous to others, but it cannot be gainsaid that for all these activities there
are some people who are exercising fundamental, personal choices and
the law is interfering with this choice for “no good reason”, let alone a
compelling reason.
Under the current structure of constitutional adjudication, a court is
ill-equipped to deal with the fundamental rights claim in a creative and
responsive manner. Since the 1985 decision in Big M,111 it has been
accepted constitutional doctrine that an accused person can challenge the
constitutionality of criminal law even if the legislation can be applied in
a constitutionally sound manner to the circumstances of the accused’s
case. In other words, the irresponsible drug user and the abusive polygamists are allowed to argue that the law violates the rights of others who
may be deserving of constitutional protection. The Big M approach to
standing may expand the ability of Canadians to raise constitutional
claims, but it is self-defeating. First, bad facts make bad law, and when a
court is confronted with an abusive polygamist it is unlikely to find the
exercise of a fundamental, personal decision on the facts, or it will,
consciously or inadvertently, elevate and exaggerate the state objective. It
111

“Big M”].

R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

104

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

is hard to find that the state does not have a compelling interest when you
are dealing with rights-violators and not rights-advocates.
More significantly, judicial activism will be further deflated when a
court has to consider the zero-sum option of the invalidation of a blanket
prohibition. If the court invalidates the blanket prohibition to protect the
interests of a certain percentage of accused persons who are exercising
fundamental choices, it leaves the state powerless, at least temporarily, to
deal with those who are hurting others, or themselves, under the guise of
exercising fundamental choices. The court can issue a suspended
declaration of invalidity, but this still leaves the future uncertain.
In the United States, an individual can launch an “as-applied” challenge in addition to a facial challenge — the as-applied challenge
“targets the constitutionality of the statute as it is applied in the particular
context of the case, and seeks to invalidate it only as applied to those
circumstances”.112 This nuanced approach lowers the stakes of our zerosum invalidation game and could encourage greater judicial activism in
the realm of fundamental, personal choice. The exploitive polygamists
can be sanctioned in law while the polygamists who pose no risk of harm
to others or society at large will have their fundamental choices protected
by the Constitution. Unfortunately, this approach appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of constitutional
exemptions. A constitutional exemption under section 24(1), in lieu of
the remedy of invalidation under section 52, is the equivalent of the “asapplied” form of constitutional review, but the Court has consistently
frowned upon this alternative remedy.113 Most recently, the Court stated
that “such exemptions are to be avoided”114 for the reasons cited in
Ferguson:
Attractive as they are, the arguments for constitutional exemptions in a
case such as this are, on consideration, outweighed and undermined by
counter-considerations. I reach this conclusion on the basis of four
considerations: (1) the jurisprudence; (2) the need to avoid intruding on
the role of Parliament; (3) the remedial scheme of the Charter; and (4)
the impact of granting constitutional exemptions in mandatory sentence
cases on the values underlying the rule of law.115
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Without a constitutional exemption in the remedial armour, a court
will easily succumb to the standard state argument that a blanket prohibition is essential to maintain the integrity of its prohibition, and that it is
impossible for lawmakers to fashion a nuanced, exempting scheme to
protect those who are genuinely exercising a fundamental, personal
choice. In the assisted suicide challenge, and the marijuana challenges,
the Court acceded to the state’s argument that legislative resort to blanket
prohibitions were necessary in order to “protect the vulnerable” and that
there did not exist an effective mechanism for distinguishing in advance
which people seeking assisted suicide or the use of marijuana would be
vulnerable to the harms for which the law was enacted in the first place.
One has to wonder whether the creation of a nuanced, exempting
scheme is beyond the competence of both court and legislature, or
whether it is really a question of political will. For example, in Rodriguez, Lamer C.J.C., in dissent, provided a detailed set of criteria to be
followed for those who wished to exempt themselves from the blanket
prohibition on assisted suicide.116 Although one could still argue over
some of the details of this exempting scheme, his simple efforts, and the
fact that subsequent to Rodriguez some jurisdictions have enacted
exempting schemes,117 clearly undercuts the legislative claim of impotence and suggests the problem is more related to indolence and a lack of
political will.
If legislatures resist the allure of blanket prohibitions, and courts employ more nuanced remedies than simple invalidation, there will be
greater protection for fundamental, personal choices. For example, the
value of flexibility is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s
treatment of the controversial issue of minors refusing blood transfusions
based on religious objections. In A.C. v Manitoba,118 the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of legislation in Manitoba, which permitted the state
to override the objections of a minor to a blood transfusion. The legislation created a presumption that the wishes of minors over 16 would be
determinative unless it could be shown they lacked capacity to understand their decision. No such presumption existed for minors under 16.
Not being faced with a blanket legislative prohibition on minors under 16
being allowed to refuse a blood transfusion, the Court was able to
116
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reconstruct the legislation to require that a court still undertake to
balance the best interests of the child against the state interest before
overriding the wishes of the minor. With this judicial construction, and
the introduction of some degree of flexibility into the legislation regime,
the Court was then able to dismiss the section 7 claim for invalidation on
the basis that the legislation struck the right balance. Without wholesale
invalidation, the Court was able to protect both the integrity of the
legislation and the interests of the young person.
Due to the fact that the medical choices remain the only personal
decision which has been consistently characterized as a fundamental
right under section 7, it is not surprising that this is the one area in which
the courts have resisted the allure of the argument that blanket prohibitions are indispensable to effectively achieving the legislative objective.
As mentioned earlier, in the context of medical marijuana and safe
injection sites, the courts have effectively required the legislature, or
executive, to create exempting provisions to facilitate the medical use of
a prohibited substance, or to permit a prohibited substance to be used in a
controlled environment. These decisions did not lead to a surrender by
the state in its war on drugs, nor did the introduction of flexibility and
nuance impair the integrity of its prohibition. However, these decisions
do permit the state to continue pursuing its policy of drug prohibition
while allowing fundamental, personal choices to be respected and
protected by exempting these choices from the reach of the prohibition.
The tide may be turning, as appellate courts have recently taken a
more skeptical approach regarding the state’s insistence that only a
blanket prohibition will suffice to achieve a state objective. In Adams, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the claim that a blanket
prohibition on temporary, makeshift shelters was necessary to prevent
nuisance and disorder, as the Court believed that the state could construct
more flexible “time, place and manner” regulations and in this way
protection could be given to a homeless person’s fundamental, personal
choice on how to shelter himself or herself in public spaces.119 Most
recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford found the living on the
avails provision to be constitutionally overbroad, and rejected state
arguments that a blanket prohibition on accepting payment for services
rendered to a sex worker was necessary to prevent abuse and harm to
society. The Court stated:
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The Supreme Court has identified two circumstances in which a blanket prohibition can escape a charge of unconstitutional overbreadth.
The first is if a narrower prohibition will be ineffective because the
class of affected persons cannot be identified in advance: Clay, at
para. 40. The second is if there is a significant risk to public safety in
the event of misuse or misconduct: Clay, at para. 40; Cochrane, at
para. 34. In our view, neither circumstance is present here.
No case has been made out for a blanket prohibition on the second
basis, danger to the public at large. The objectives of the living on the
avails provision have not been cast in terms of public protection; rather
the legislation is more narrowly focused on protecting prostitutes from
exploitation. As we have said, this is a group that is uniquely
vulnerable because of the nature of prostitution itself and the legislative
framework that surrounds most prostitution-related activities. The risk
of harm from pimping accrues principally to the prostitute, not the
general public.
The case for a blanket prohibition on the first basis — the difficulty of
identifying the vulnerable group in advance — is superficially more
compelling. We are, however, satisfied that the application judge was
right to find that the living on the avails provision violates the
overbreadth principle.120

Although this decision was predicated on a deprivation of the security interest, and not the liberty interest of making a fundamental personal decision, it does signal a more exacting review. In the majority of
cases dealing with restrictions on liberty, the Court has acceded to the
state’s claim that blanket prohibitions were integral to the integrity of a
criminal prohibition by undertaking a highly deferential form or rational
basis review, whereas, in this case, the Court appeared to be looking for a
more solid empirical foundation beyond assertions based on limited
research and anecdotal evidence. In Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “it is not
enough to identify a public purpose that would have justified Parliament’s action. ... Where its action is grounded in the criminal law, the
public purpose must involve suppressing an evil or safeguarding a
threatened interest.”121 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bedford is
120
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one of the few occasions where a court seemed to demand from the state
actual proof of the evil being fought instead of speculation about an
imaginary axis of evil.

V. CONCLUSION
Substantive due process is a form of judicial review designed to give
effect to the oft-quoted metaphor that the Charter is a “living tree capable
of growth”. If the courts continue to rely upon history and tradition to
constrain the growth of fundamental, personal decisions, constitutional
review will not yield “a vibrant living tree but a garden of annuals to be
regularly uprooted and replaced”.122 The prohibition on assisted suicide
in Canada was largely premised upon an understanding of history and
tradition, but reliance upon past practice has not led to a conclusive and
final determination of the issue. Since the assisted suicide decision was
rendered in 1990, there have been two efforts to revisit the constitutionality of the prohibition,123 and this is not surprising since a historical
approach does not address the reality that values are constantly evolving.
Tradition may be a good starting point for assessing whether the law is
unnecessarily interfering with the exercise of a fundamental, personal
decision, but, ultimately, if substantive due process is to be more than an
academic issue to be debated, the courts will need to begin to struggle
with the thorny issue of whether tradition has been overtaken by evolving values.124
In the assisted suicide case, Sopinka J. was aware of the stultifying
impact of history on constitutional analysis. He noted that “[i]t is not
sufficient ... to conduct a historical review. ... [A] strictly historical
analysis will always lead to the conclusion in a case such as this that the
deprivation is in accordance with fundamental justice.”125 Although
Sopinka J. was unable to resist the call of history in making his decision
on assisted suicide, his wise admonition must be taken seriously if
substantive due process is to have any impact on the reach of substantive
criminal law. In determining whether a restriction of liberty is legitimate
122
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and sounds in the constitutional register, it matters little if the criminal
prohibition has existed from time immemorial. Nor is it sufficient for
assessing the validity of contemporary offences to simply trivialize the
restriction on liberty by concluding that the conduct being prohibited has
never in the past been considered a fundamental, personal decision. The
rule of law demands that the state be able to provide a reasoned justification for the restriction, and this justification should be compelling and
contemporary. It should also be capable of being proved in an objective
manner without resort to unsubstantiated assertions, provocative anecdotes and personal opinion. Of course, historically, courts have never
called upon lawmakers to justify their actions, but now that the constitutional tools are in place to facilitate this obligation to provide a reasoned
justification, it does not seem entirely unreasonable or revolutionary to
require the state to satisfy this obligation before it throws someone in jail
for the exercise of a fundamental, personal decision.

